Friday, August 26, 2016

Cách Mạng



Cách Mạng


Lỗ Tấn , trong truyện Ả Q , có nói đại ý như sau về ý nghĩa của Cách Mạng, qua miệng một nhân vật:

Cách Mạng là Cách cái Mạng của mình đi,[( trong đó là gia đình mình, gia đình những người khác trong xã hội ), tức là Đứng lên , Làm việc để Thay đổi ( cách = cách tân, thay đổi, cải cách v.v.) để tiến bộ, sung túc, thịnh vượng, thăng hoa.]


Đồng bào à,

Hãy Cách cái Mạng của con mình, nhà mình, làng xóm, xã hội, đất nước  mình đi.


Rừng đã hết, Biển đang chết, Sông đang nguy khốn, Cá đã chết, và Người đang  đối diện bao nguy tai, độc hại

Wednesday, August 24, 2016

Người Dân Chính Là Chủ Đất Nước


                                    *

Đến một lúc nào đó, chính những người dân thường cũng thấy chuyện chính trị nó liên hệ tới mình, và rõ là có những lúc mật thiết, như chị Kha, ngư dân trong bài này, từ tháng Năm , năm ngoái.

Đồng bào ơi,

Người dân thường không hiểu những cái khúc mắc, liên hệ chằng chịt trong tương quan giữa đời sống cá nhân với cuộc sống xã hội , với k/tế, ch/trị , nhưng, từ giờ,  hãy tâm niệm nằm lòng như sau , vì đó là những điều ghi rất rõ ràng trong Tuyên Ngôn QT Nhân Quyền, Công Ước Q/tế về Quyền Chính trị vả Dân sự, cũng như Hiến pháp rất nhiều nước. Và ngay trong cả Hiến pháp CHXHCN Vietnam.

Người làm chủ thực sự của đất nước này là tôi, gia đình bạn bè, thân nhân tôi, cũng như g/đình bạn, thân nhân , bạn bè bạn. Những người khác cũng thế, chứ không phải một nhà nước, chính quyền nào là chủ đất nước cả.

Khi một ch/quyền “đầy tớ của Nhân dân” nào làm việc tắc trách, không hiệu quả, thối nát, tham tàn v.v. làm khổ, đọa đày, bức hiếp dân , thì bấy giờ Ông chủ Nhân dân phải bước ra, đứng lên, gióng tiếng, la rầy phê bình, đòi thay đổi, nếu tên đầy tớ mà không nghe thì đuổi nó đi, bầu chọn lên người khác để đại diện , để làm việc , và trù tính phương sách , công việc đưa đời sống mình, xã hội đất nước mình đến chổ ổn định, tiến bộ, thịnh vượng hơn. Đó là Dân làm chủ đất nước.

Đó chính là nghĩa thực sự nằm trong  những từ : Chính phủ của dân, do dân và vì dân. Và rất nhiều các q/gia tiên tiến, ‘trung tiến” Dân chủ-Tự do cũng cố gắng đạt đến một xã hội trong nền tảng tinh thần như vậy.

Tôi đã nhắn gởi tới mọi người về ý nghĩa Dân Là Chủ đất nước nhiều lần , bây giờ xin nhắc lại nữa.

REF



http://www.rfa.org/vietnamese/reportfromvn/fishmen-protest-china-06032015080024.html


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Tại Hà nội

Ăn cướp trắng trợn, làm sao dân không bức xúc đòi đuổi
Tôi là dân; tôi đuổi các anh đấy.

Như thế, người dân này đã hiểu ra Quyền Công dân của mình. Đó 
là những điều ghi rất rõ ràng trong Công Ước Q/tế về Quyền
Chính trị và Dân sự, cũng như Hiến pháp rất nhiều nước. Và ngay
 trong cả Hiến pháp CHXHCN Vietnam.
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vBJw24FZ2y8&feature=youtu.be



Chính quyền này tồn tại là do bố con tôi. Bố tôi, 95 tuổi. 7-80 năm tuổi đảng. Ông là 1 trong 12 người cứu quốc ở cái Hà Nội này.... Đây là nỗi uất ức của mộ...




Thơ, Luận của Ralph Waldo Emerson


FRiday  JULY 24, 20151216 Reads
Do not go where the path may lead, go instead where there is no path
and leave a trail. “ ( RWE)
*
The poets are thus liberating gods. The ancient British bards had for the title of their
order, "Those who are free throughout the world." They are free, and they make free…
Thi sĩ, vì thế , là những thần giải phóng. Những thi nhân hát-thơ Anh-cát-lợi xưa được
một danh hiệu, “ Những kẻ Tự do khắp chốn trần thế.” Họ tự do, và họ khiến (người) được tự do…

The Poet ( Thi Sĩ)
A moody child and wildly wise Pursued the game with joyful eyes, Which chose, like meteors, their way, And rived the dark with private ray: They overleapt the horizon's
edge, Searched with Apollo's privilege; Through man, and woman, and sea, and star,
Saw the dance of nature forward far; Through worlds, and races, and terms, and times, Saw musical order, and pairing rhymes.
Olympian bards who sung Divine ideas below, Which always find us young, And always keep us so.
Là đứa trẻ sầu mộng, sáng suốt hoang dã (*)
Rong chơi mê mải trần gian
Lao tới như đường thiên thạch
(Cuồng si) xé toạc bóng đêm
bằng chớp sáng
Phóng vượt các chân trời
Tìm mộng-thực bằng phong cách Apollo
Qua hồn đàn ông, đàn bà, biển và sao
Chiêm ngưỡng vũ điệu thiên nhiên
miền xa thăm thẳm
Qua các vùng trời, chủng tộc, điều kiện, kỷ niên
Thấy tiết tấu cõi này, (du dương) vần điệu
Kẻ hát thơ giữa đời Thần tiên trao gời
Những khúc ca (đẹp tươi) thánh thiện
Khiến ta trẻ mãi
thiên thu.
* dịch với chữ “dã” ( ví dụ, không dịch “hoang toàng”, “hoang dại”) , như thế mới phù hợp với tâm thức Emerson, vốn lấy Thiên nhiên làm trọng trong tinh thần, và thơ, tiểu luận của ông.
---
...
The breadth of the problem is great, for the poet is representative. He stands among
partial men for the complete man, and apprises us not of his wealth, but of the common-wealth. The young man reveres men of genius, because, to speak truly, they are more
himself than he is. They receive of the soul as he also receives, but they more (*). Nature enhances her beauty, to the eyes of loving men, from their belief that the poet is beholding her shows at the same time. He is isolated among his contemporaries, by truth and by his art, but with this consolation in his pursuits, that they will draw all men sooner or later. For all men live by truth, and stand in need of expression. In love, in art, in avarice, in politics, in labor, in games, we study to utter our painful secret. The man is only half himself, the other half is his expression.
Vấn đề lớn rộng, bởi thi sĩ là kẻ đại diện. Ông là tượng nổi của con người toàn diện giữa những con người phiến diện, và nói lên điều này cho ta biết, đây là tài sản chung (của con người) , chứ không phải của riêng ông. Người (thi sĩ) trẻ tôn kính những thiên tài, bởi lẽ những vị này, để diễn đạt chân thực, họ đã thể hiện ( chân tính) nhiều hơn chàng ta. Họ tiếp nhận linh hồn/tâm linh như chàng, nhưng họ “là” , họ thể hiện được nhiều hơn. Thiên nhiên diễm lệ quyến rũ hơn lên, hiển lộ, trong mắt người yêu thiên nhiên, là kỳ vọng chàng
thi sĩ sẽ ngưỡng mộ. (Trong thế giới mình) thi sĩ cô lập với những người đồng thời, nơi sự thật và nghệ thuật của mình, nhưng chàng bằng lòng, vì theo (cảm nhận) của chàng, việc mình làm sẽ hội tụ/hội ngộ được đám đông. Vì con người sống bằng sự thật, và cần được diễn đạt, thông tri. Trong tình yêu, trong nghệ thuật, trong tham lam, ham muốn, trong chính trị, lao động, trò chơi, chúng ta học cách tỏ bày những đớn đau thầm kín. Con người chỉ là một nửa mình, nửa kia là cách diễn đạt của hắn.
* như thiếu chữ “are” ở đây trong bản đánh máy của website ?
… Too feeble fall the impressions of nature on us to make us artists. Every touch should thrill. Every man should be so much an artist, that he could report in conversation what had befallen him. Yet, in our experience, the rays or appulses have sufficient force to arrive at the senses, but not enough to reach the quick, and compel the reproduction of themselves in speech. The poet is the person in whom these powers are in balance, the man without impediment, who sees and handles that which others dream of, traverses the whole scale of experience, and is representative of man, in virtue of being the largest power to receive and to impart.
…Ấn tượng thiên nhiên để lại dấu ấn trong chúng ta quá mờ nhạt để có thể khiến ta trở thành nghệ sĩ. Mọi xúc tiếp đáng lý nên làm ta rung động. Mỗi người lý ra phải là một nghệ sĩ, để có thể tiếp nhận, rồi tường trình giao cảm của mình mà thiên nhiên trao tặng. Nhưng, (tiếc thay), trong kinh nghiệm chúng ta, ánh sáng, hay lực kéo có thể diễn ra với ngũ giác, nhưng lại không thể khiến (óc mẫn tri ) nhanh bắt được sóng mà tái tạo lại chúng qua ngôn ngữ. Thi sĩ là người có được sự cân bằng các năng lực này, là người có thể “kiến thọ” không ngăn trở, và ứng xử với chúng cách mà những người khác mơ ước, chàng là kẻ “trên vai hai vầng nhật nguyệt” đi về trong kinh nghiệm “lữ thứ” , và đại biểu cho con người, theo cung cách là nguồn tiếp nhận và trao lại mạnh mẽ, (nồng nàn) nhất.
For the Universe has three children, born at one time, which reappear, under different names, in every system of thought, whether they be called cause, operation, and effect; or, more poetically, Jove, Pluto, Neptune; or, theologically, the Father, the Spirit, and the Son; but which we will call here, the Knower, the Doer, and the Sayer. These stand respectively for the love of truth, for the love of good, and for the love of beauty. These three are equal. Each is that which he is essentially, so that he cannot be surmounted or analyzed, and each of these three has the power of the others latent in him, and his own patent.
The poet is the sayer, the namer, and represents beauty. He is a sovereign, and stands on the centre. For the world is not painted, or adorned, but is from the beginning beautiful; and God has not made some beautiful things, but Beauty is the creator of the universe. Therefore the poet is not any permissive potentate, but is emperor in his own right. Criticism is infested with a cant of materialism, which assumes that manual skill and activity is the first merit of all men, and disparages such as say and do not, overlooking the fact, that some men, namely, poets, are natural sayers, sent into the world to the end of expression, and confounds them with those whose province is action, but who quit it to imitate the sayers. But Homer's words are as costly and admirable to Homer, as Agamemnon's victories are to Agamemnon...
Vì Vũ trụ có ba người con, sinh cùng lúc , (nhưng) tái hiện khi này khi khác dưới những cái tên khác nhau, trong các hệ thống tư tưởng; chúng có khi được gọi là Nguyên nhân, Tiến trình, hay Hậu quả; hay thơ hơn thì là Jove, Pluto, Neptune; hoặc, theo kiểu thần học thì là Cha, Thánh thần, và Con, nhưng ở đây ta sẽ gọi là Người Biết, Người Làm và Người Nói. Ba
“trự” này biểu trưng cho lòng yêu cái Chân, cái Thiện và Mỹ. Cả ba đồng hạng. Trong căn cốt, mỗi thứ đều là chính nó, (đại diện cho thể tính nó), nghĩa là nó không thể bị “leo lên, đè xuống” mổ xẻ, phân tích, và mỗi đều “mang bóng dáng”, năng lực của hai thứ kia tiềm
tàng trong nó, cũng như hình hài bản quyền chính nó.
Nhà thơ là người phát ngôn, kẻ gọi tên, và làm đại biểu cho cái đẹp. Hắn có thẩm quyền
tối thượng, và lập cước nơi trung tâm. Bởi thế giới từ khởi nguyên— đã Đẹp đẽ — không cần sơn phết, tô chuốc, trang điểm; và (lúc ấy) Thượng đế cũng chưa làm ra những thứ đẹp, nhưng cái Đẹp (viết hoa) đã là người sáng thế của của vũ trụ (1), Vì vậy nhà thơ không phải là một ông hoàng hay lãnh chúa lười nhác, dễ dãi, nhưng là một đế vương, trong
chính bản sắc. Phê bình (của cuộc đời, trong đời sống xã hội) thường vướng đầy những
giả dối, đạo đức giả của tinh thần vật chất khi cho rằng bàn tay giỏi giang, sức vóc năng động mới là ưu điểm hạng nhất của con người, và đánh giá kẻ nói nhiều, làm ít là kém cỏi; quên đi có những người, định danh là thi sĩ, vốn là những người phát ngôn tự nhiên, những người được đem đến cho thế giới ở tận cùng diễn đạt, và lầm lẫn (thi sĩ) với những người trong thế giới hành động, nhưng bỏ nghề, quẳng nghiệp để bắt chước nhà thơ. Nhưng những giòng chữ của Homer thì cũng đắt giá và đáng ngưỡng mộ đ/với Homer, như chiến thắng của Agamemnon thì đắt giá, đáng trân quý với Agamemnon... (2)
...
The sign and credentials of the poet are, that he announces that which no man foretold.
He is the true and only doctor; he knows and tells; he is the only teller of news, for he was present and privy to the appearance which he describes. He is a beholder of ideas, and an utterer of the necessary and causal. For we do not speak now of men of poetical talents, or of industry and skill in metre, but of the true poet. I took part in a conversation the other day, concerning a recent writer of lyrics, a man of subtle mind, whose head appeared to be a music-box of delicate tunes and rhythms, and whose skill, and command of language, we could not sufficiently praise. But when the question arose, whether he was not only a
lyrist, but a poet, we were obliged to confess that he is plainly a contemporary, not an eternal man. He does not stand out of our low limitations, like a Chimborazo under the line, running up from the torrid base through all the climates of the globe, with belts of the herbage of every latitude on its high and mottled sides; but this genius is the landscape-garden of a modern house, adorned with fountains and statues, with well-bred men and women standing and sitting in the walks and terraces. We hear, through all the varied music, the ground-tone of conventional life. Our poets are men of talents who sing, and not the children of music. The argument is secondary, the finish of the verses is primary.
Dấu hiệu và biểu thị tài năng của thi sĩ là, ông tuyên ngôn điều chưa ai nói. Ông là một
bác sĩ đích thực và duy nhất; ông biết và thông báo; là kẻ duy nhất có thể gọi là “thông tri”, bởi ông hiện diện và tham dự vào hiển lộ ông diễn tả. Ông là kẻ chiêm nghiệm ý tưởng, và là người nói lên điều cần thiết và nhân quả. (Ở đây) chúng ta không bàn đến những tài năng thơ, hoặc sự cần mẫn, năng khiếu trong âm vận, mà đang nói đến những thi sĩ đích thực. Trong một mạn đàm (về thơ) ngày nọ, tôi có gặp một vị viết lời thơ, âm điệu rất thanh
nhã, điêu luyện, người mà khả năng diễn đạt bằng ngôn ngữ chúng tôi không thể hết lời tán tụng. Nhưng khi bàn đến vấn đề ông có đích thực là một nhà thơ, hay chỉ là người có kỹ năng tuyệt vời với âm-lời, chúng tôi buộc phải nhận định là ông chỉ là “tiếng nói” đương thời, không phải cái thuộc vĩnh cửu (3). Trong cảm nhận của chúng tôi, dù không đặt quá cao xa, nơi ông, không toát ra điều như núi lửa Chimborazo, theo đuờng (contour) đi lên từ chân gốc bỏng nhiệt , kinh qua mọi thời tiết , quanh mình là đầy những rơm cỏ nơi các vĩ tuyến, cùng các mặt đậm nhạt sắc màu; thì tài năng lớn của ông chỉ như vườn-phong cảnh trong một căn nhà đới mới, trang trí tuợng và suối phun nước, quý ông, quý bà lịch thiệp đứng ngồi đây đó nơi các lối đi, thềm bậc. Chúng tôi nghe ra : âm thanh đap nền cho
một đời sống ước lệ/quy ước, qua các thang âm được nghe. Nhà thơ ( theo ý cao quý của Emerson) của chúng tôi là thi tài hát (thơ), không phải là con đẻ của âm nhạc. (4) Tranh luận/làm rõ nghĩa là thứ yếu, việc hoàn tất bài thơ mới là (cho đích đáng, hoàn thiện) mới là chính yếu.
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Từ đây trở đi không trích phần Anh ngữ
Lịch sử ta gọi là thiêng liêng chứng thực rằng ngày sinh của một nhà thơ là một sự kiện
chính yếu trong ghi chép thứ tự lịch sử. Con người, thường xuyên bị nhầm lẫn trong khoan đó, dù sao cũng vẫn theo dõi sự xuất lộ của một người anh em, người có thể soi sáng một chân lý cho tới khi họ có thể thấy bằng ánh sáng của mình. Thường, tôi đọc một bài thơ có khả năng soi sáng hồn tôi bằng cả một khoái lạc lớn rộng! Và khi ấy xiềng xích hồn tôi được phá vỡ; tôi vượt lên trên mây mờ và khung trời đục tôi hiện hữu trong đó — đục nhưng mang vẻ trong— và từ thiên đàng chân lý tôi sẽ thấy, và hiểu ra được liên hệ, tương quan của tôi. Đìều đó khiến tôi có thể làm hòa với cuộc sống, nhìn thiên nhiên với cặp mắt mới mẻ, “canh tân” nó, nhìn những thứ tầm thường, nhỏ nhặt khác đi, và biết mình làm gì. Đời sống không còn là những âm thanh hỗn độn; tôi sẽ thấy đuợc đàn ông, đàn bà và phân biệt được họ khác với kẻ si dại hay ác quỷ ra sao. Ngày này là ngày còn tươi đẹp hơn cả ngày sinh nhật của tôi : (ở ngày sinh nhật) tôi là một con thú, bây giờ tôi được mời vào cõi khoa học của sự thật. (5). Đấy là hi vọng, nhưng hoa kết quả thế nào còn phải chờ. Thường khi thì : người có cánh bay này, kẻ sẽ mang tôi tới thiên đàng này, quẳng tôi lên mây, phóng nhảy ( rất nghệ thuật ) với tôi từ đám mây này sang đám mây khác, khi vẫn xác định là ông ấy đang hướng về cõi của Đế thiên; và tôi, vốn là kẻ tập sự, chỉ có thể dần chậm nhận ra là ông ta không biết lối đến thiên đường, mà chỉ là “cầu cong ảo vọng” làm tôi thán phục khả năng bay của ông, như chim bay, cá vượt khỏi măt đất hoặc mặt nước một chút. Nhưng với cõi trời có
khả năng thâm nhập, dưỡng dục bao la và thăm thẳm kỳ diệu , ông ta không thể nào vào cư ngụ. Tôi, sau đó, lại trở về với góc tường vôi trắng lòng mình, và lại sống đời “hào hoa hư ngụy” như xưa, và mất niềm tin vào những người có thể đưa tôi đến nơi mình muốn đến.
...
Vũ trụ là cái xuất lộ, hiển hoạt bên ngoài của linh hồn. Nơi nào có đời sống , điều ấy
phát sinh ra hiện hữu chung quanh. Khoa học của chúng ta là “cái” mang tính cảm xúc, xúc chạm, vì thế nó cạn nông. Trái đất, các thiên thể, vật lý, và hóa học, chúng ta học, tìm hiểu một cách “cảm giác”, như thể chúng tự hiện hữu; nhưng những thứ này hiện hữu như kẻ giúp việc, hậu thuẫn cho Hữu thể chúng ta mang trong mình…
...

…Thiên nhiên làm nên con người, và (vì) đã nuôi hắn đến trưởng thành, Bà không còn sợ mất hắn, nhưng bà gỡ từ hắn ra một hình hài-tính nhân mới, cái thể loại không thể bị
hủy hoại như con người xác thịt. Thế nên khi Linh hồn thi sĩ đã trưởng thành, bà mới gỡ ra gởi đi những bài thơ, bài hát từ hồn thơ ấy— một “truyền nhân” vô uý, vô miên ( không ngủ), bất tử, không bị Thời gian làm mai một—một truyền nhân sống động, trên vai có cánh (thiên thần) [ vốn là đặc tính mà linh hồn hắn được sinh thành]; đưa hắn nhanh về những phương trời miên viễn; gắn vào tim hắn vô vàn không đảo ngược được. Bài hát/thơ, như thế bay lượn bất tử trong vòm trời, sẽ bị rất nhiều phản đối, “kết án” ồn ào của đám đông hơn gấp bội và đe dọa sẽ nuốt chửng truyền nhân này, nhưng cuối cùng chúng rớt lại, sau những phút bềnh bồng nhảy với ngắn ngủi, rồi tan rã, vì vốn là hiện thân không cánh từ xuất xứ không cánh. Trong khi đó, tiếng du dương của thần thái
tiêu dao mặc xứ, mật xứ của nhà thơ thẩm thấu sâu trong thời gian không cùng.


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REF

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Sunday, August 21, 2016

Very Brief Notes Concerning Kant’s “Synthetic, Analytic A Priori Reasons"

                                                            * * *



1. Experience does not consist of the 5 sense impressions only. There is the experience of the 6th mental consciousness ( Buddhist 
mano-vijñāna), namely the consciousness/mind/knowing faculty


2. Example : 2-3 y/o boy is  hit by a ball thrown secretly by his father, mostly from the back, to play with him and see the boy's reaction. Sometimes the action causes some very soft “pain/discomfort”. After about 4,5 times every other day for 2 weeks, boy starts to "wonder what happens"

   2a) This example is very primordial, more than any of Kant’s &others’ examples which involve more adult-like persons, who have more experience and entanglement. Therefore the "traces" in the toddler's consciousness are simpler, purer to "observe", "analyze".

    2b) When he starts realizing he’s bothered by the ball hits, he wants to find out what happens
    2c) Then later ( we do not know how long,  a week, 2 wks, 1 month, 2 months, depending on how often he is hit and how uncomfortable he feels) he wants to know "why". This wanting to know why can be said as part of his nature ( human’s nature).

    2d) And this wanting to know "why" has its roots from the experience of getting hit, feeling uncomfortable. This can be said as the cause of the effect wanting to know why
   2e) Speaking in term of Kant’s example “ Every alteration must have a cause” then:
a)      Cause : getting hit and feeling the discomfort
b)     Alteration: starting to wonder what happens and asking why

3. Feeling uncomfortable and starting to ask "why" :
   3a) Feeling uncomfortable is sense experience, starting to ask "why" in the mind/consciousness is what ? Not experience ? A purely “creation” of analytic reason, in a “deductive” train of thoughts, process ? And are they separate ?
   Reminder: Pavlov’s dog experiment

4. Knowledge of Alaya Consciousness and its associations with 7 other consciousnesses; biological psychology; scientific research on neural communication etc. will help understand better the problems of “the analytic”, “a priori” elements (concepts) , how they could be interconnected, inter-been ( meaning their interbeing formed) , frequently very haphazardly, suddenly and unpredictably

5. I doubt very much the usefulness, or qualification of the distinction on the content, range, domain etc. of the idea, concept, definition of “EXPERIENCE” in Kant and others’ similar delimitation to divide, separate analytic a priori 'experience' [ I would still classify what Kant said of that which is a priori knowledge, and independent of experience as "experience of a different category"], or components of pure reason, the type which happens only inside the mind and through analytic (deductive) reasoning  with all their creation,  connection, relation to be defined as “ a priori” elements, components of the a priori knowledge  and the experience which is given by the association between the mind and objects , even objects of abstract expression , content, outside the mind. Especially if they are said to have no relation, connection, interconnection with Experience , even sense experience. The inference and examination, explanation, interpretation from Psychology & “Philosophy” ( or here, can be extracted to call Reason) of the phenomena involving Pavlov’s dog reaction to bell, can serve as evidences for this seemingly inseparable between two types of experiences: namely, one of the 5 senses and 6th consciousness, or knowing mind.

6. By the way, in some sense of connection: The logic, pure logic definitions, elements, categories, propositions, rules in Husserl’s “Logical Investigations”, have no primordial contents , meanings , functions, or applicability. They came into being, were worked out, developed,  after advances had been made from the development of the modern sciences, mathematics, philosophy, in advanced stage. Husserl’s “logical investigations” and its expression, meaning could be more sophisticated , compared to the meaning of the Greek philosophers in Aristotle’s time, and could find more applicability in some subjects of higher mathematics and physics, but for other studies in the sciences, and even the philosophies, the applicability of Aristotle’s logic , or symbolic logic, formal logic from the 19th century are much much wider

7. Here is another example. This year our yard has a different  yield of persimmons. At the bottom of the fruits, many have some black spots about 1-2 sq inches, which did not appear in the persimmons of last year. I have some experience with planting, pruning, gardening for the last 6-8 seasons and basically know how some trees nurture themselves, live, grow and the effect of sun, wind, water, fertilizers, different types of soil condition etc. to the health of the trees, but do not possess the knowledge of an professional experienced planter of 20 years. I am also a person who frequents himself with reading, thinking in philosophy, science. And this is what happened in my mind when trying to look for the solution to my persimmons’ problem.

With averagely satisfactory skill of amateur experience in planting, gardening the best causes I can come up are heat/light or water. We may have excess water, because in general that’s how it will turn the leaves brown in their edges and give black spots to the bottom of the fruit [ but again, how can the browning problem around the edges happen only to the right hand side, not the left where the leaves receive more heat/light, which may balance out the “cooler/colder effect of excessive water? I don’t know the answer, yet.] Anyway, the point is, with 6-8 years of planting experience, all I could come up were the effect of heat/light and amount of water used in watering. I felt like I was thrown into a situation, with my 6-8 years experience, where my ability to use reason , the reason of Kant’s : synthetic a priori, is so limited, so poor. I felt like I was lost, and had a very blurred vision on the road to find the true answer to my tree’s problem. The other reasons which I were reminded of , or given information on were the possibilities that the tree is having a disease, or it is lacking some nutrients like Manganese, or Zinc. Again those reasons appeared only after I had consulted the Internet for the possible causes. So in Kant’s view : it belongs to the synthetic a posteriori type of reason. The only analytic or deductive a priori reason I can observe is in the following :
        The black spots on the persimmons of this years, which did not occur to the persimmons last year, can only be caused by the change of conditions. That observation and reason is almost obvious and readily available. Just almost like, if you have enough understanding of the physics of motion,  the reason in Newton’s second law of motion: Particle will accelerate/decelerate if there is a change of force acting on it, otherwise it will stay at rest, or move with constant speed.


And we do have a problem with excessive water for the persimmon tree in watering because the sprinkler malfunctions.

8. Experience can be thought of as a great well, full of immense potential and information to nurture, feed, support the activities of what logic defines as deductive reasoning, or, broader in Kant's term : analytic a priori reason. Whether inside the brain, or through continuous, further interaction with the outside world, without experience, without its showing clarity , clear way, "pure" reason, will be like a man with blurred vision trying to find his way around. This means, without information, data, "communication" from experience (in the widest sense), through thousands , or millions of pieces of information , data, etc. working behind many, many layers and interconnections,  "pure" reason can not function. It is a monumental, fundamental source on which the empirical sciences and philosophies are built. But it is very bothersome, one-sided, and consequentially lacking to see the experience of 6th consciousness, knowing mind being left out in a definition like this :

" Empiricism is a theory that states that knowledge comes only or primarily from sensory experience.[1] 

Also in the same article, but sounding better in "reasoning":

One of several views of epistemology, the study of human knowledge, along with rationalism and skepticism, empiricism emphasizes the role of empirical evidence in the formation of ideas, over the notion of innate ideas or tradition ;[2] empiricists may argue however that traditions (or customs) arise due to relations of previous sense experiences.[3] " 



9. This is what John S. Mill thinks and I paraphrase him: You can only know, or arrive at the truths of things— whether it is the taste of an apple, the color of the sky; or the validity of the proof of a mathematics, physics  problem, the soundness of an argument— in two ways, and none of it from analytic ( a priori) reasoning, like Kant thinks.


Truths are known to us in two ways—
*directly, by themselves,
*and through the medium of other truths. 
The former are the subject of intuition or consciousness; the latter are the subject of inference. The truths known by intuition are the basic premises from which everything else is inferred. Our assent to a conclusion is based on the truth of the premises; so we could never acquire knowledge by reasoning unless something could be known in advance of all reasoning. ( J.S. Mill- System of Logic )

10. And this is what D. W. Hamlin wrote on what he thought on Mill’s position:



[Mill] claimed that mathematical truths were merely very highly confirmed generalizations from experience; mathematical inference, generally conceived as deductive [and a priori] in nature, Mill set down as founded on induction. Thus, in Mill's philosophy there was no real place for knowledge based on relations of ideas. In his view logical and mathematical necessity is psychological; we are merely unable to conceive any other possibilities than those that logical and mathematical propositions assert. This is perhaps the most extreme version of empiricism known, but it has not found many defenders.[20]





11. Gottlob Frege’s analyticity of transitivity, negation, opposite, symmetry extends the Kant’s concept of analytic a priori reason to where it finds applicability. Meanwhile the synthetic a priori— especially the combination of both synthetic a posteriori and a priori reasons— still holds strong for many other mathematical, scientific truths. Both of Frege’s and Kant’s notions, I believe, can not count off their relations with experience, or a posteriori propositions and truths.

12. The only source of knowledge is experience- Albert Einstein. The "experience" here can be said of as a general, common  meaning of experience, but it will hold as valid with the sharp, detailed analysis of philosophy, analytic philosophy included.


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REF

https://archive.org/stream/immanuelkantscri032379mbp/immanuelkantscri032379mbp_djvu.txt

https://www.britannica.com/topic/empiricism

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empiricism


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FR4S1BqdFG4


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oLSmNcem2X0&list=RDoLSmNcem2X0#t=41

Husserl’s Turn of Direction and His Debt to Brentano



                                            *

This is,  I believe, where Edmund Husserl owed something to Franz Brentano, specifically directedness, intentionality, and act of presentation in consciousness, after studying with Brentano on representation, intentional acts, mental phenomena, inner consciousness etc. Later, when developing his phenomenology Husserl just set them on a different ground, namely the ground of logical categories, essences, forms, relations, interconnections, effects, rules etc., in similar issues for analysis and rules of logic at the time which philosophers of language, cognitive consciousness and theory of meaning will explore— in the manners of John Stuart Mill, Gottlob Frege, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Donald Davidson do; while Brentano built them on the empirical base as how Psychology as a subject of study had been scientifically involved and reaped success.

One example of Husserl’s method to get to the phenomenological
perceptions, appearances, intended objects of things, whether real or imagined, is how an apple appears in “our” stream of consciousness. He said he had “inverted” the process of “seeing”, perceiving, performing acts of intention etc.(1) This means, now his investigation will share very little, not to say anything with other empirical sciences, for example, physics, chemistry, biology , psychology,  because :

1.  Not only the way he performs his seeing, perceiving. phenomenological searching, “looking-into” is (very) different from the ways the other sciences, meaning:

His direction to observe, investigate has very little to do with the  way other sciences approach the object of investigation in exploration and explication. This means : he will not cut the apple out to see what inside, does not taste it, weigh it, calculate its density, analyze its chemical characteristics, molecular structures, etc. and how it may rot— all these may be called “outer” consciousness to him and his followers.  But he will only investigate how its image was/is formed in his mind, how it appears in representational act, extract essences, or if the object has an essential relation to language, he will investigate the meaning of signs, expression, intention-meaning, intention-fulfillment, reflect on analyze them,  etc… to clarify many things; detecting errors, or misunderstandings etc. of psychologism or other sciences and philosophers, psychologists. This change of direction is geared totally toward the inside working of the consciousness, or what happens inside; what often called inner consciousness.

2.  Not only this way of observing, investigating, the objects he studies are now different too, namely, it is not the apple we see, touch, eat, carry out other “experiments” to understand it the ways the sciences as mentioned above will do, to have a “real”, “physical”, corporeal sense of understanding, the way David Hume or sometimes, Immanuel Kant want to perceive. But the objects, intentional, or intended objects are images, representations, appearances, and how they appear, associate, correlate, interconnect, and under what essences (Eidos), what logically-related, intuitively-formed category, connectedness, relation, and meaning etc. Inside our brain, inside consciousness, and do not have to do anything with the real physical objects outside—
this can be totally, all-enduringly as Husserl sees it. This is how I “see” Husserl’s phenomenology appears and expresses,

Notes:

1) The inverted method to have noema, noesis and eidetic seeing, noematic content etc. can be read from p.216 to p. 227 in Ideas Pertaining to… (IPPPP1). I took some pictures, in case someone is really interested can read them for some very short/brief idea, and do not have to buy the book.

2. Pay attention to 2 paragraphs : “Everything which is purely immanent…psychological essence of the intentive mental process”,  you will see how he describes the difference form his intentioned objects and the objects of other sciences, starting from the end of p.216 to middle of p.217

3. Despite what Husserl claimed about his novel way of “seeing” things, his phenomenological method of observing, perceiving, structuring experiences et., I believe, plenty of times his Phenomenology will share the similar way of constructing ideas, theories, logic as those of J.S. Mill. G. Frege, B. Bolzano, I.Kant or R. Descartes , as evidenced in his “Logical Investigations”.

CH


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REF:


1. Husserl, Edmund. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book. Trans. F. Kersten. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 1983. Print.  (IPPPPP1)

2.Husserl, Edmund. Logical Investigations.Vol. 1. Trans. J. N. Findlay. New York: Routledge. 2008. Print

3. Brentano, Franz. Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. Trans. Antos C.Rancurello, D.B.Terrell and Linda L.McAlister.


4. Moran, Dermot. Introduction. Logical Investigations. By Edmund Husserl. Trans. J.N. Findlay. London: Rutledge. 2001. Print.

5. Varga, Peter. Brentano’s Influence on Husserl’s Early Notion of Intentionality. http://philpapers.org/rec/VARBIO



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1. All the data of our consciousness are divided into two great classes—the class of physical and the class of mental phenomena. We spoke of this distinction earlier when we established the concept of psychology, and we returned to it again in our discussion of psychological method. But what we have said is still not sufficient. We must now establish more firmly and more exactly what was only mentioned in passing before.
This seems all the more necessary since neither agreement nor complete clarity has been achieved regarding the delimitation of the two classes. We have already seen how physical phenomena which appear in the imagination are sometimes taken for mental phenomena.
There are many other such instances of confusion. And even important psychologists may be hard pressed to defend themselves against the charge of self-contradiction.* For instance, we encounter statements like the following: sensation and imagination are distinguished by the fact that one occurs as the result of a physical phenomenon, while the other is evoked by a mental phenomenon according to the laws of association. But then the same psychologists admit that what appears in sensation does not correspond to its efficient cause. Thus it turns out that the so-called physical phenomenon does not actually appear to us, and, indeed, that we have no presentation of it whatsoever—certainly a curious misuse of the term “phenomenon”! Given such a state of affairs, we cannot avoid going into the question in somewhat greater detail.
*

Every idea or presentation which we acquire either through sense perception or imagination is an example of a mental phenomenon.1 By presentation I do not mean that which is presented, but rather the act of presentation. Thus, hearing a sound, seeing a colored object,
feeling warmth or cold, as well as similar states of imagination are examples of what I mean by this term. I also mean by it the thinking of a general concept, provided such a thing actually does occur. Furthermore, every judgement, every recollection, every expectation,
every inference, every conviction or opinion, every doubt, is a mental phenomenon. Also to be included under this term is every emotion: joy, sorrow, fear, hope, courage, despair, anger, love, hate, desire, act of will, intention, astonishment, admiration, contempt, etc.

Examples of physical phenomena, on the other hand, are a color, a figure, a landscape which I see, a chord which I hear, warmth, cold, odor which I sense; as well as similar images which appear in the imagination. These examples may suffice to illustrate the differences between the two classes of phenomena.

3. Yet we still want to try to find a different and a more unified way of explaining mental phenomena. For this purpose we make use of a definition we used earlier when we said that the term “mental phenomena” applies to presentations as well as to all the phenomena which are based upon presentations. It is hardly necessary to mention again that by “presentation” we do not mean that which is presented, but rather the presenting of it. This act of presentation forms the foundation not merely of the act of judging, but also of desiring and of every other mental act. Nothing can be judged, desired, hoped or feared, unless one has a presentation of that thing.Thus the definition given includes all the examples of mental phenomena which we listed above, and in general all the phenomena belonging to this domain.
It is a sign of the immature state of psychology that we can scarcely utter a single sentence about mental phenomena which will not be disputed by many people. Nevertheless, most psychologists agree with what we have just said, namely, that presentations are the foundation for the other mental phenomena.

Inner Consciousness*
1. Disputes about what concept a term applies to are not always useless quarrels over words. Sometimes it is a question of establishing the conventional meaning of a word, from which it is always dangerous to deviate. Frequently, however, the problem is to discover the natural boundaries of a homogeneous class.

We must have a case of the latter sort before us in the dispute about the meaning of the term “consciousness,” if it is not to be viewed as mere idle quibbling over words. For there is no question of there being a commonly accepted, exclusive sense of the term. The surveys of the different uses of this term made by Bain,† in England, and by Horwicz  in Germany, show this beyond any doubt. Sometimes we understand it to mean the memory of our own previous actions, especially if they were of a moral nature, as when we say, “I am not conscious of any guilt.” At other times we designate by it all kinds of immediate knowledge of our own mental acts, especially the perception which accompanies present mental acts. In addition, we use this term with regard to external perception, as for example when we say of a man who is awakening from sleep or from a faint that he has regained consciousness. And, we call not only perception and cognition, but also all presentations, states of consciousness. If something appears in our imagination, we say that it appears in consciousness. Some people have characterized every mental act as consciousness, be it an idea, a cognition, an erroneous opinion, a feeling, an act of will or any other kind of mental phenomenon. And psychologists (of course not all of them) seem to attach this meaning in particular to the word when they speak of the unity of consciousness, i.e. of a unity of simultaneously existing mental phenomena.

For any given use of the word, we shall have to decide whether it may not be more harmful than helpful. If we want to emphasize the origin of the term, doubtless we would have to restrict it to cognitive phenomena, either to all or to some of them. But it is obvious that there is rarely any point in doing so, since words often change from their original meaning and no harm is done. It is obviously much more expedient to use this term in such a way as to designate an important class of phenomena, especially when a suitable name
for it is lacking and a discernible gap is thereby filled.* For this reason, therefore, I prefer to use it as synonymous with “mental phenomenon,” or “mental act.” For, in the first place the constant use of these compound designations would be cumbersome, and furthermore,the term “consciousness,” since it refers to an object which consciousness is conscious of, seems to be appropriate to characterize mental phenomena precisely in terms of itsdistinguishing characteristic, i.e., the property of the intentional in-existence of an object,
for which we lack a word in common usage.

2. We have seen that no mental phenomenon exists which is not, in the sense indicated above, consciousness of an object. However, another question arises, namely, whether there are any mental phenomena which are not objects of consciousness. All mental phenomena are states of consciousness; but are all mental phenomena conscious, or might there also be unconscious mental acts?
(Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint-Franz Brentano)


****


From Prolegomena (of Husserl’s Logical Investigations)

Schleiermacher’s definition of logic as the technology of scientific knowledge certainly comes closer to the truth. For obviously in a discipline so defined one would have to consider only what is peculiar to scientific knowledge, and to probe its possible demands: the further preconditions which in general favour the emergence of knowledge would be left to pedagogy, hygiene etc. But Schleiermacher’s definition does not plainly say that this technology should also set up rules for the demarcation and construction of the sciences, whereas this aim, on the other hand, includes the aim of scientific knowledge. Excellent thoughts towards the circumscription of our discipline are to be found in Bolzano’s Wissenschaftslehre, but rather in his preliminary critical searchings than in the definition he himself espouses. This last


* technology , in old meaning = a “skillful”, solid, valid method, “kỹ thuật”


Chapter 2

Theoretical disciplines as the foundation of normative disciplines

§ 13 The controversy regarding the practical character of logic Our last discussions have given so obvious a justification to the view of logic as a technology, that it might seem remarkable that there should ever have been controversy on  this point. A practically oriented logic is an indispensable postulate of all the sciences, and this corresponds to the historical fact that logic arose out of practical motives connected with the business of science. This we know happened in those thought-stirring times when the young, budding science of the Greeks was in danger of succumbing to the attacks of sophists and subjectivists, when all its future success depended on finding objective criteria of truth, which might destroy the cheating illusions of the sophistical dialectic.

In modern times, mainly under the influence of Kant, there have been repeated denials that logic is a technology, though such a characterization has, on the other hand, been held to have some value: this dispute cannot have turned on the mere question whether it is possible to give logic practical aims, and so to conceive of it as a practical discipline.

Kant himself spoke of an applied logic which should have as its task the regulation of the use of the understanding ‘under the contingent conditions of the subject, which might hinder or assist it’ (Critique of Pure Reason: Intro. to Trans. Logic, I, last paragraph A54/ B78– 9), and from which we might learn ‘what promotes the correct use of the understanding, what assists it and what cures it from logical mistakes and errors’ (Kant’s Logik, Introduction II, Hartenstein’s edition 1867, VIII, p. 18). Though he is not willing to let it rank, with pure logic, as an authentic science, though he even thinks that ‘it should not properly be called logic’ (Critique of Pure Reason, Werke, ed. Hartenstein, III, p. 83), everyone is none the less at liberty to extend the aim of logic so as to include applied, practical logic. 1 It may in any case be disputed, as has in fact frequently happened, whether great gain can be hoped for from logic as a practical theory of science, whether, e.g. one could really hope for such great revolutions and advances from an extension of the old logic (which could only serve to test given knowledge) into an ars inventiva, a ‘logic of discovery’, as Leibniz is known to have believed etc. This dispute, however, concerns no point important in principle, and it is settled by the clear maxim that even the moderate probability of a future advance in the sciences justifies us in working on a normative discipline pledged to this end, without regard to the fact that the rules we deduce represent a valuable enrichment of knowledge.

The genuinely disputed question of important principle, to which neither side has given precision, lies in quite a different direction: whether the definition of logic as a technology really touches its essential character. We ask, in other words, if it is only a practical standpoint that establishes the right of logic to count as a peculiar scientific discipline, while, from a theoretical standpoint, all the findings accumulated by logic consist, on the one hand, in purely theoretical propositions having their original home in otherwise known theoretical sciences, and mainly in psychology, and, on the other hand in rules based on these theoretical propositions.

The essence of Kant’s conception of logic does not, in fact, lie in the fact that he disputes the practical character of logic, but that he believes in the possibility and the epistemologically basic character of a certain delimitation or restriction of logic, which would make of it a wholly independent science, one which, in comparison with otherwise known sciences, is wholly new and entirely theoretical,  and which, like mathematics, stands outside of any thought of possible application, in being an a priori, purely demonstrative discipline.

The restriction of logic to its theoretic knowledge-content leads, on the prevailing form of the doctrine opposed to Kant’s, to psychological and perhaps also grammatical and other propositions, i.e. to small excerpts from otherwise delimited, and, let us add, empirical sciences. Whereas, on Kant’s view, we rather dig down to an internally closed, independent and, let us add, a priori field of theoretical knowledge, to pure logic.

It is apparent that other weighty oppositions are at work in these doctrines; whether logic should count as an a priori or an empirical science, as an independent or dependent science, as a demonstrative or non-demonstrative science. If we drop these questions as remote from our immediate interests, only the above mentioned point of dispute remains: on one side we abstract the assertion that under every logic thought of as a technology lies a peculiar theoretical discipline, a pure logic, whereas, on the other view, all theoretical doctrines admitted into the logical technology are held to be classifiable in otherwise known theoretical sciences.

The second point of view was stoutly defended by Beneke, 2 and J. Stuart Mill stated it clearly in his Logic which has also been influential in this respect. 3  Sigwart’s Logik, the leading contribution to recent logical work in Germany, also stands on similar ground. Clearly and decisively it is there said: ‘The highest task of logic, and the one which constitutes its real essence, is to be a technical discipline’. 4
On the other side we have, in addition to Kant, principally Herbart, and a large number of their disciples. How easily the most extreme empiricism accords in this
(Logical Investigations-E. Husserl. pp.26-30 )

4. The Structure of Embodied Experience
Summary: Husserl’s phenomenological investigations emphasize that the lived body functions as the central “here” from which spatial directions and distances are gauged; that it is the locus of distinctive sorts of directly felt sensations such as the experience of tactile contact; and that it is capable of self-movement, opening a rich range of practical possibilities.
Husserl’s approach to disclosing the natural attitude for what it is and suspending its wholesale, automatic efficacy is termed the phenomenological reduction, which leads us from the natural attitude of everyday life to the phenomenological attitude. Within the phenomenological attitude, we set aside questions framed in terms of an ultimate “being” or “reality” existing utterly in itself; instead, we make experiencing—and correlatively, phenomena, which means whatever is experienced, exactly as experienced—the focus of our investigations. For a phenomenology of embodiment, this means turning to the body of direct experience in a way that is even more radical than acknowledging everyday encounters with embodied persons in the personalistic attitude. Why is it more radical? It is because in everyday practical life, we are typically occupied with things and tasks, and ignore the bodily “means whereby” we perceive things and carry out our activities. Although the “anonymity” of this tacitly functioning, everyday body becomes a key theme in existential phenomenology of the body, Husserl too was well aware of it, and it was his groundbreaking research that initially retrieved this lived body and bodily experience from its anonymity. ( https://www.iep.utm.edu/husspemb/ )